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Conison: Introduction

Symposium
THE STATE OF TORT LAW AT THE TURN OF
THE MILLENIUM-AN INTRODUCTION
Jay Conison*

The Monsanto Lecture has become well recognized as a "major
outlet for torts scholarship in the United States."' This year, four2
distinguished Monsanto Lecturers from prior years-Ernest Weinrib,
George Priest,3 Richard Epstein,4 and Ian Ayres s - were invited to return
to Valparaiso and reflect on the state of tort law at the turn of the
millennium. In a well-attended symposium moderated by Judge Guido
Calabresi, another Monsanto alumnus, 6 all four speakers concluded that
there are substantial grounds for concern over the state of tort law.
However, they did so for four very different reasons. The four lectures
are reported in this issue of the Valparaiso University Law Review.
Professor Weinrib, in Does Tort Law Have a Future?7, is deeply
troubled by the impact of instrumentalism on tort law. He sees "internal
corruption of tort law's conceptual scheme" and, in his lecture, examines
instrumentalism's impact on core notions of duty and proximate cause.
Professor Weinrib begins his analysis with the proposition (argued for in
his other writings) that tort liability is necessarily "bipolar." By this he
means that it links the defendant and plaintiff to each other as "doer and
sufferer of the same injustice." Because of this bipolarity, any justification
for imposing tort liability must consider both parties and must focus on
Dean and Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.
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Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989).
3 George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701 (1992); George L.
Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. LAW. REV. 1 (1987).
4 Richard A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL U. L REV. 757 (1992);
Richard A. Epstein, A Clash of Two Cultures: Will the Tort System Survive Automobile
Insurance Reforn?, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 173 (1991).
5 Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With Puts, 32 VAL U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
6 Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859

(1996).
734 VAL. U. L. REV. 561 (2000).

555
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2000], Art. 5

556

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35

their injustice-based relationship. Classical tort law does impose liability
on the basis of this type of justification. Classical tort law, moreover, is a
structure whose concepts gain their meaning from a view of the parties
as related by an injustice. For example, the notion of foreseeability, under
classical tort law, is a concept that "links the plaintiff's injury to the
reason for characterizing the defendant's action as wrongful." Because
classical tort law is based on justifications and concepts that consistently
build on the notion of a plaintiff and defendant related by an injustice, it
forms a coherent and fair framework for the imposition of liability.
This is not so in modem negligence law. In Professor Weinrib's
view, instrumentalism has radically altered the concepts and justification
practices of tort law. While contemporary tort law purports to use the
same concepts as classical tort law, it does so in name only. Concepts
such as foreseeability are emptied of their normative content. Social
goals that center on one or the other party in isolation replace bipolar,
justice-based reasons for imposing or not imposing liability. To illustrate
this transformation, Professor Weinrib describes a test for duty of care
that has been adopted by Canadian courts. At the critical step in this test,
a court determines whether a prima facie duty of care (whose existence is
established at an earlier stage) should be negated or limited by policy
considerations that focus on one party only. Professor Weinrib argues
that this test is analytically incoherent and disconnected from the
underpinnings of tort law. In the end, Professor Weinrib argues, tests
such as this, and more generally the move to instrumentalism, deprive
tort law of any claim to be a "fair and coherent justificatory enterprise."
Professor Priest, in The Culture of Modern Tort Law,8 is equally
troubled about the future of tort law. However, his reasons emerge from
an examination of strict liability, rather than negligence, and from an
economic, rather than justice-based approach.
Professor Priest begins with the observation that, from an
economic standpoint, negligence and strict liability standards differ very
little. Hence, the evolution in tort law from negligence to strict liability
standard should have had little impact on the overall pattern of case
outcomes. Yet, clearly, tort law over the last several decades has been
marked by tremendous change. Most notably, there has been "a vast
increase in the number of suits, in the number of settlements, and in the
magnitude of liability payouts and insurance premiums." How can this
puzzle be explained?

8 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 573 (2000).
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Professor Priest's insight is that there is a culture of tort law. By
culture he means "a set of attitudes and expectations embedded in the
conceptual basis," which can promote and channel the growth of legal
doctrines. Strict liability law, according to Professor Priest, is not based
solely on economic efficiency; rather, it is more deeply rooted in a
cultural attitude that "repeat defendants . . . are in a vastly superior
position than consumers to protect and insure against injury and loss."
This cultural justification explains many features of the law that are
inexplicable from an economic perspective.
In particular, it explains why courts determine the liability of a
manufacturer, not by reference to the conduct of the manufacturer and
consumer, but by reference to an ideal product that the manufacturer
could have marketed. Under this approach, the central question for
liability in products cases is whether the manufacturer could have done
anything to prevent the injury-a question that, on its face, seems to
compel a "yes" answer. Professor Priest then notes that this test for
liability is not logically limited to products cases. The result is that the
general question for tort liability has become whether "some change in
corporate behavior could have prevented the harm suffered by the
injured plaintiff in this case."
The consequence, according to Professor Priest, has been an
unfettered expansion of tort liability. That might not be objectionable if
the expansion had been accompanied by a corresponding increase in
consumer safety resulting from the change in the law. But in fact it has
not: Professor Priest argues that the increase in consumer safety in the
last half-century stems from non-legal factors. The upshot of the
evolution in tort law, thus, has been a massive shifting of resources-to
attorneys, experts, and individual plaintiffs- "for no clear productive
end." Professor Priest concludes with a warning that the redistributive
culture of tort law threatens our nation's economic growth.
Professor Epstein is concerned about yet another problem: the
threat to our nation's healthcare system posed by efforts to interfere with
the current.system of vicarious liability (or, more precisely, non-liability)
for managed care organizations (MCO's). In Vicarious Liabilityfor Health
Plans for Medical Injuries,9 Professor Epstein describes this current
structure as contractual and urges that we allow it to continue to evolve.

934 VAL. U. L. REV. 581 (2000).
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To explain the current system, he draws parallels between recent
developments in healthcare law and the history of workers
compensation. He first makes the important point that our modern,
statutory workers' compensation system largely adopts systems that had
been voluntarily established by employers. As he explains, these systems
arose from employers contracting out of vicarious liability for harms
caused by one worker to another. Vicarious liability law, he argues, is a
system of default liability terms. In the case of workers' compensation,
the parties contracted around the terms to reach efficient solutions.
Professor Epstein then draws an analogy between workers'
compensation law and the current law on vicarious liability for MCO's.
The foundation of the latter is ERISA preemption of a wide range of tort
liability of MCO's.10 Professor Epstein argues that preemption creates a
"default contractual provision which could be waived by the health plan
if it so chose." Unlike as with workplace injuries, the default position is
absence of liability, rather than liability. Nonetheless, it is a default
regime of vicarious liability, which the parties could contract around. In
fact, they do not, and Professor Epstein argues that MCO's do not waive
the default contractual position because "it is more efficient to channel
tort liability.., through direct actions against the physician or hospital."
Professor Epstein then reviews current efforts to displace this
contractual resolution of vicarious liability with legislative solutions such
as patient bills of rights and direct actions against MCO's. He finds that
they threaten the system under which MCO's serve as necessary
gatekeepers of limited healthcare resources. Professor Epstein concludes
that it is best to allow the present system to continue to evolve. Yet, in
the end, he fears that legislative or other non-contractual interference
may be politically inevitable.
The fourth symposium participant, Professor Ayres, is
concerned with a very different kind of development in tort law, viz.,
state settlements of mass tort litigation that can be used to cartelize a
market. More specifically, he is concerned with settlements that cartelize
markets transcending the state's borders. In Using Tort Settlements to
Cartelize," Professor Ayres describes how recent settlements of cigarette
litigation brought by states have been structured so as to raise prices
toward monopoly levels, share monopoly profits between the

10 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2000). See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41 (1987); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
1134 VAL. U. L. REv. 595 (2000).
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manufacturers and the settling state, and deter new entrants into the
market. He expresses concern that a market for settlements of this type
could emerge, where states compete with each other for the right to
participate in a carteliz. They would compete by offering to take, as part
of the settlement, a smaller share of the monopoly profits than other
states. A "race to the bottom" becomes a real possibility.
Professor Ayres then notes that "[ijf such shenanigans do not
violate federal law, we are potentially in a lot of trouble." Yet, as he
shows, there probably is no basis under current law for invalidating such
cartelizing agreements. He thus urges legislation that would directly
attack the problem and prohibit "state settlements which condition
payments on future out of state sales."
These four lectures serve as an impressive introduction to the
conceptual, jurisprudential, and political challenges facing tort law at the
turn of the millennium, The Valparaiso University School of Law is
pleased to be able to host their publication. These excellent works reflect
our continuing commitment to providing, through the Monsanto
Lecture, a public forum for inquiry into the most challenging and
significant issues in tort law and tort jurisprudence. We hope you benefit
from the lectures as much as did the faculty, students, and lawyers who
attended the symposium.
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